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This study gauges workers’ degree of openness to significant changes in the
organization, style, and design of a written report by analyzing metaphors
that emerge from their talk about their report-reading and decision-making
tasks. Workers at two work sites—in Maryland and in Washington DC—
responded to two typical work reports: one written in the style currently in
use and another in a fundamentally different style exhibiting features that
make documents easy to read and understand. The dominant metaphor
that the Maryland workers used was ‘‘the whole-man’’ approach, which
represented the workers’ flexible approach toward work tasks that
resulted in their willingness to accept the fundamentally different report.
In contrast, Washington DC workers used the metaphors ‘‘paint by the
numbers’’ and ‘‘stay within the lines’’ when describing their work. These
metaphors suggest the workers’ adherence to organizational routines and
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uncomfortableness with change that caused them not only to reject the
new reports but also to have strong emotional reactions toward them.
These results indicate that assessing organizational talk, particularly the
metaphors people use, is a useful tool in gauging workers’ perceptions
about and degree of openness toward communication change.
Keywords
communication change, communication norms, metaphors, organizational
discourse, organizational interaction
Both practitioners and researchers claim that change has become a constant in
organizational life. International competition, market alterations, new tech-
nologies, mergers and acquisitions, rapid new product cycles, and inefficient
organizational routines require many organizations to significantly alter their
processes, structures, and even cultures. In fact, Beer and Nohria (2000) made
the dramatic claim that many organizations must change or die.
Even if organizations face extraordinary, compelling reasons for change,
implementing it, particularly in large bureaucracies, can be extremely dif-
ficult. The change literature documents numerous change efforts that have
failed, some with disastrous consequences (Kyriakidou, 2011). Choi (2011)
observed that approximately two thirds of change efforts are unsuccessful.
Burnes (2004) indicated that the change failure rate is probably much
higher. Communication research on genre (Bazerman, 1994; Miller,
1984; Orlikowski & Yates, 1994; Yates & Orlikowski, 1992, 2002) and
organizational metaphor, particularly an organization’s root metaphors
(Suchan, 1995, 2006), suggests factors that make communication change
particularly difficult.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) provides a
striking example of how difficulty with communication change caused a
disastrous failure. In 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated over
the southwestern United States, causing the deaths of its seven crew mem-
bers. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003) determined that
the same cultural, communication, and organizational-structure problems
that caused NASA to neglect O-ring problems, resulting in the Space Shut-
tle Challenger’s fuel tanks exploding in 1986, were also responsible for
causing NASA to downplay the danger of foam insulation sloughing off the
launch’s fuel tanks and damaging Columbia’s wing. Despite the 1986 Chal-
lenger disaster, a highly critical Rogers Commission report, and significant
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congressional and public scrutiny, NASA was unable to make the necessary
significant changes to its communication processes and the culture that
helped create and institutionalize those processes that might have prevented
another disaster.
Organizations vary significantly in their openness, willingness, and
capability to change. Gauging an organization’s openness to change is crit-
ical if its leaders are to design change strategies and processes that its work-
ers will understand, perceive as credible, and believe to be of value to
themselves and the organization. Unfortunately, assessing an organization’s
openness to change has received limited attention in the organizational
change and strategy literature and almost no attention in the business, man-
agerial, and professional communication literature.
Research Purpose
My main purpose for this research is to begin the incremental process of gen-
erating knowledge about organizational openness to communication change.
Specifically, I want to gauge workers’ degree of openness to significant
changes in the organization, style, and design of a written report by analyzing
their language—their talk about their report-reading tasks that constitute most
of their work—and the organizational root metaphors and their entailments
that emerge from and steer or influence that language. From this research
we can determine whether assessing organizational talk, particularly the
metaphors that people often use, would be useful in gauging workers’ percep-
tions about and degree of openness to communication change.
In the following sections, I review the literature assessing organizational
openness to change in order to derive a baseline definition to ground our
understanding of this concept; assess the managerial and professional com-
munication research on change; explicate root metaphor theory to provide a
framework for discussing and analyzing the research data; describe the
research context, design, and methods; analyze the interview data, particu-
larly the metaphors members used to describe their communication tasks
and how those metaphors reflect individual and collective attitudes toward
change; and discuss the implications that the research findings have for
communication researchers, consultants, and organizational leaders.
Literature on Openness to Change
Change researchers have just started systematically investigating openness
to organizational change (Kyriakidou, 2011). Because this research is
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formative, there is no agreed-on language to describe this individual or
organizational state. In fact, researchers have used terms such as openness,
readiness, capability, capacity, and even resistance to describe this individ-
ual or organizational receptiveness toward change somewhat interchange-
ably, causing conceptual confusion (Armenakis, Harris, & Mossholder,
1993; Jansen, 2004). To help mitigate this confusion, Chawla and Kelloway
(2004) divided change into attitudinal (cognitive) and behavioral responses.
Openness and readiness toward change relate to attitudinal or cognitive
responses whereas resistance, capacity, and capability relate to behavioral
responses.
Fishbein and Azjen (1975) pointed out that individuals’ attitudes precede
and affect their behavior; consequently, their degree of openness toward
change can predict their overt actions. To put it another way, the degree
of openness that an individual feels toward change is the cognitive precur-
sor to that individual’s behaviors of either embracing or working toward
implementing a change effort or resisting and even actively undermining
that effort (Choi, 2011; Miller, Johnson, & Grau, 1994). Research, then,
enables us to define a worker’s openness to change as a psychological state
reflecting a positive attitude or perception toward change that influences the
worker’s willingness to implement a particular change effort (Axtell et al.,
2002; Devos, Buelens, & Bouckenooghe, 2007; Wanberg & Banas, 2000).
This causal relationship between attitude and behavior is important; it
enables us to make a clear distinction between openness and resistance to
change. This distinction has practical value because it allows change agents
to diagnose the degree of organizational openness to change before crafting
a change strategy. That degree of openness can influence the timing of the
change, the framing of the change message, the amount of change that can
be expected from each change effort, the number of change champions
required to drive the change, the communication change strategy, and a
number of other factors.
Developing methods to assess organizational openness to change poses
an interesting methodological challenge. The few studies on change open-
ness (only five in the last 30 years) have used quantitative techniques (pri-
marily surveys) to determine how organizationally specific context
factors—trust in senior managers and direct supervisors, information
received about the change, perceived ability (self-efficacy) to cope with the
change, and participation in the change-decision process—positively affect
openness to change (Axtell et al., 2002; Devos et al., 2007; Miller et al.,
1994; Wanberg & Banas, 2000). But McCall and Bobko (1990) recom-
mended using qualitative techniques for studying workers in dynamic, fluid
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environments such as organizations. In particular, they suggested that to
understand workers’ attitudes or perceptions, analyses that interpret organi-
zational semantic, symbolic structures—particularly the metaphors used in
organizational talk—are very useful. For example, Jansen (2004) observed
that workers in some organizations rigidly follow organizational routines,
repeating, often clinging to, past actions and patterns of activities. Signifi-
cant individual and organizational energy is spent maintaining these current
organizational processes, resulting in limited psychological energy for
change and a lack of openness toward new ways of thinking and acting. This
lack of openness can be heard in informal organizational talk and formal
presentations and is represented in metaphors contained in documents and
other written messages. Qualitative methodologies best capture such inter-
action data.
Because organizational change researchers have just started grappling
with the construct of openness toward change, they have not yet examined
if organizational semantic and symbolic structures, particularly organiza-
tional talk and metaphor, can serve as a barometer to assess workers’ degree
of openness to change. Furthermore, many change researchers have not yet
taken what management studies often call the linguistic turn; consequently,
they tend to view language as merely instrumental—as a conduit that
explains change, not as a barometer that gauges degrees of openness to
change.
Genre Research and Communication Change
Recent research in genre provides insight into the organizational challenges
of changing communication norms though this work has yet to address
worker attitudes that cause those challenges. During the last 20 years, genre
research has moved beyond characterizing messages (business proposals,
shareholder reports, presentations, etc.) solely by their formal, structural
features to embracing a broader view that emphasizes the social actions that
writers and readers perform as they create and respond to written and oral
messages (Bazerman, 1994; Miller, 1984). According to this view, a genre’s
purpose is socially constructed by organizational members’ perceptions of
it, and the community’s expectations about purpose and form (media
choice, message design, and message organization and style) govern the
ways that members typically create or respond to a genre (Orlikowski &
Yates, 1994; Yates & Orlikowski, 1992, 2002).
Over time a genre’s purpose and form create communication habits or
routines. In fact, Orlikowski and Yates (1994) described a genre as an
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‘‘institutionalized template’’ (p. 542) that continuously shapes communica-
tive action through workers’ ongoing use. Their view of genre suggests that
its purpose and form act as an organizational control system that both
enables and constrains communicative behavior through members’ ongoing
appropriation of genre norms. Workers often unconsciously draw on these
norms from habit to simplify interaction and presumably guarantee commu-
nication success. For example, Navy officers routinely turn to electronic
files of point papers, a unique Navy genre, that superiors have approved
in order to mimic prior papers’ style, organization, and depth of analysis
regardless of the situation. Such habitual appropriation of genre norms can
ossify behavior about genre use so that it is difficult to make any meaningful
changes to a genre’s purpose and form.
But a genre is not by definition determinate; it is constraining and malle-
able, or, to put it another way, softly determinate (DeSanctis & Poole,
1994). Genre researchers, though, have different assessments of the degree
of constraint that genre templates and workers’ genre-use habits impose on
a genre. For example, Forman and Rymer (1999) claimed that a genre is
dynamic, that genre users can readily change genre rules in response to
shifts in organizational context. On the other hand, Yates and Orlikowski
(2002) were more guarded about workers’ ability and willingness to tacitly
or explicitly change genre rules. They indicated that small-order incremen-
tal changes, often inadvertent, are fairly common. But significant changes,
or second-order changes, are far more difficult to achieve (Barley, 1986).
Although these genre studies help researchers understand constraints to
changing communication behavior, they do not delve into attitudinal factors
that cause a genre to be deeply institutionalized, taken for granted, and habi-
tually enacted in some organizations and viewed more provisionally—as
something that can be significantly modified according to internal or exter-
nal influences—in other organizations. This perception of genre malleabil-
ity is a product of workers’ interpretive schemes or mental models. These
schemes act as personal and organizational maps that help workers organize
and make sense of their workplace experiences and influence their interac-
tions. A wide range of organizational factors create these interpretive
schemes, including structure, reward systems, control systems (policy and
formal rules and regulations), resource availability, and, most important, the
alignment of these organizational systems. Furthermore, many softer fac-
tors, such as organizational rituals, stories, and metaphors, are instrumental
in forming these schemes. Organizational metaphors in particular provide a
useful entrée to understanding these schemes. These metaphors reveal
workers’ attitudes that influence their reactions to attempts to change
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well-established communication genres or organizational communication
practices in general. Furthermore, as McCall and Bobko (1990) suggested,
these metaphors and workers’ explanations of their significance provide
insight into the organizational factors that shape their attitudes toward com-
munication change.
Managerial and Professional Communication
Research Focusing on Change
Communication instructors (particularly in master of business administra-
tion [MBA] and executive MBA programs), researchers, consultants, and
in-house professionals often try to change inefficient, dysfunctional com-
munication practices by helping workers to alter their thinking processes,
improve their communication strategies, and develop new skills. But these
professionals often encounter resistance from workers because their com-
munication habits and the genres resulting from those habits have become
entrenched routines that continually reaffirm the purpose and form of the
established communication practices. Thus, workers or their superiors often
resist attempts to change communication practice because the changes rep-
resent a significant organizational intervention. Despite this ongoing chal-
lenge of changing inefficient workplace communication habits, only a
handful of studies have addressed communication change and the power
of language to create or restrain such change.
My earlier study (Suchan, 1995) on the influence of organizational meta-
phors on writers’ perception of and approach toward their tasks indicates
that these metaphors provide insight into workplace communication prac-
tices. I found that writers at three of an organization’s largest field sites
viewed themselves as ‘‘ciphers’’ or ‘‘conduits’’ and described their compos-
ing processes in mechanistic terms. These metaphors complemented the
mechanistic language that management and staff commonly used to
describe the organization’s various systems (e.g., reward, control, structure,
and resource) and processes, thus reaffirming the influence of these meta-
phors on their written communication practices. Specifically, writers’ lack
of awareness or concern about their readers, extensive use of passive voice
and convoluted sentence structures, lack of attention to document design,
and other dysfunctional communication practices were direct outgrowths
of their viewing their work role as that of a cipher or conduit. Consequently,
to alter these writers’ communication habits would be a major intervention
requiring a change in the organization’s dominant metaphors and its orga-
nizational systems.
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Not until 11 years later did I describe processes needed to change
dysfunctional communication practices in a large, complex organization
(Suchan, 2006). Borrowing heavily from the literature on organizational
change and development, I proposed a theory-based framework that
focuses on steps toward understanding workers’ interpretive schemes
that shape their thinking about communication, the organizational
underpinnings that form those schemes, the alterations in language and
thinking required to alter those schemes, the communication training
that workers need in order to make these necessary alterations, and the
realignment of organizational systems to support the communication
change. This research, though, has a significant shortcoming. It does not
assess workers’ and the organization’s attitudes and openness toward
change.
Several other communication researchers have examined the relation-
ship between language and change. But this research fails to build on
each other to develop a more comprehensive understanding of that rela-
tionship, particularly between language and communication change.
Jameson (2001) found that chain restaurant managers collectively trans-
formed problems into stories that indicated cause-and-effect relation-
ships. This process and the stories that resulted helped these managers
advocate change and persuade important stakeholders of the rationale
for the change. Anderson (2004) examined the role that writing can play
during an attempted organizational change. He found that writing fixes
and stabilizes ideas from conversation into textual objects that help peo-
ple understand and focus on what needs to be changed. Faber (2002)
demonstrated through several case studies the power of language, narra-
tives, and organizational stories to create change. Somewhat similar to
Jameson’s work, Faber’s case studies showed that generating change
requires creating a new, compelling organizational story that is more
meaningful than the existing one. Finally, Dulek and I assessed the role
that discourse community norms have on perceptions of message clarity
(Suchan & Dulek, 1990). We discovered that these norms acted as a
barrier to communication change even when change would result in
written communication that was easier to read and understand (see also
Suchan & Colucci, 1989).
These studies merely suggest the relationship between language and
communication change. The next section, building on research in organiza-
tional communication and organizational theory, describes the power of
root metaphors and their importance in assessing degrees of openness to
communication change.
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The Role of Root Metaphors in Gauging Openness
to Change
An increasing number of organizational theory and communication
researchers claim that organizations are discursive constructs because dis-
course—talk and text—is central to individuals’ interpretation of their
work, provides a guide for action, and helps affirm organizational identity
(Fairhurst & Putnam, 2004; Ford, 1999; Heracleous, 2002; O’Connor,
1995). Taylor and Van Emery (2000) even claimed that communication
constitutes organization, that organization emerges from conversation and
textual interaction. Analyzing organizational discourse, particularly the
metaphors that people habitually use, can provide us with insight into the
concepts and attitudes of an organization’s workers. Specifically, determin-
ing and assessing an organization’s root metaphors can help us gauge work-
ers’ degree of openness to change, which in many cases may be tacit.
Root metaphors are macrolevel, linguistic organizing frameworks that
enable workers to code, sort, and make sense of their organizational expe-
rience. Gergen (1999) described these metaphors as forestructures that
workers create and use to interpretively shape their organizational world.
We can also compare these metaphors to lenses that help workers focus and
foreground what they see and guide how they interpret it. Inns (2002), in
fact, defined root metaphors as ‘‘the dominant or defining way of seeing’’
(p. 309).
What extends the power and influence of root metaphors are its entail-
ments—similar or corresponding metaphors that are connected to the root
metaphor. Entailments provide an audience with rich additional knowledge
about the root metaphor by detailing and thus helping to illustrate it. In its
strength and organizational influence, a root metaphor is similar to a dense,
tightly coupled social network: the greater the number of entailments
(nodes) and their connectiveness to each other and the root metaphor
(e.g., network density), the greater the root metaphor’s strength and ability
to influence workers’ attitudes and actions. Lakoff and Johnson (2003), for
example, claimed that one dominant root metaphor in the U.S. culture is
‘‘argument is war.’’ What makes the war metaphor powerful is its dense net-
work of entailments: we ‘‘win or lose’’ arguments, ‘‘defend’’ positions,
‘‘attack’’ weak positions, ‘‘demolish’’ claims, ‘‘shoot down’’ arguments,
plan and use ‘‘strategies,’’ and abandon positions to take ‘‘new lines of
attack.’’ This root metaphor and its large number of entailments, Lakoff and
Johnson suggested, steer communicative interactions during meetings,
negotiations, one-to-one exchanges, and question-and-answer sessions after
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presentations. Since this root metaphor is so deeply embedded in our think-
ing, attitudes, and actions, we are often unaware of how it shapes our com-
munication practice let alone how it restricts our thinking about argument in
different ways (e.g., argument as dialogue, a conversation, or even a verbal
dance).
Marshak (2002) claimed that organizational language can be either a
prison or a liberating force. That is particularly true of root metaphors; they
can provide either a means for control or potential for change. In an orga-
nization such as Disney Enterprises, the ‘‘other land’’ and ‘‘happiest place
on earth’’ root metaphors and their entailments (visitors are ‘‘guests’’ who
interact with ‘‘security hosts’’ or ‘‘cast members’’ who are always in ‘‘cos-
tume’’ when ‘‘on stage’’ at the ‘‘park’’) serve as a tight control system that
constrains thinking and action. Disney Enterprise has consciously
institutionalized this unique vision through language, training, and rewards
and punishments that are aligned to support each other. Put another way,
veteran ‘‘cast members’’ have so grooved and regrooved the other land
metaphor and its entailments into their language, thinking, and practice that
entertaining other possibilities for talking about and doing their work is dif-
ficult. In contrast, in other organizations, such as the Medic Inn, a branch of
the Cleveland Clinic, and the Marine Corps, their root metaphors—‘‘5-star
customer service’’ and ‘‘three-block war,’’ respectively—are generative.
These generative root metaphors have the paradoxical capacity to simulta-
neously guide thinking, attitudes, and practice and create potential for new
language, new perceptions, novel thinking, and different action (Schon,
1993). In short, these metaphors both reflect and help generate an openness
to change. To illustrate a generative root metaphor, I will briefly discuss the
Marine Corps’s three-block war metaphor.
In the late 1990s, the Marine Corps, under the leadership of General
Charles Krulak, adopted a new metaphor, the three-block war, to reshape
soldiers’ thinking and actions so that they would be better prepared for radi-
cally new operations and missions called military operations other than war.
This new metaphor indicates that within three city blocks and a short time, a
Marine may be required to conduct full-scale military action, engage in
peacekeeping operations, and provide humanitarian relief. In other words,
all Marines—officer or enlisted—must be capable of analyzing complex,
evolving, time-critical information to determine if they should function as
a civil military negotiator, a source of humanitarian relief, a liaison with tri-
bal or small local government officials, or a warrior. The metaphor ‘‘strate-
gic corporal’’ soon evolved as an entailment of the three-block war
metaphor to indicate the new leadership, contingency-planning, and
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decision-making capabilities that lower ranking soldiers must have. Soon
afterward another important entailment of this new root metaphor devel-
oped: The Corps now describes itself as the ‘‘911’’ of the military, capable
of quickly responding to any crisis requiring a swift, flexible, yet measured
response. The three-block war metaphor and its entailments suggest that
soldiers require different modes of thinking and new skills, particularly in
communication, to be successful in this ever-shifting environment. Further-
more, this new environment makes it impossible to develop standard oper-
ating procedures or prescribed routines to deal with situations in the field.
As one corporal commented, ‘‘acting the same way twice can get you
killed.’’
To summarize, root metaphors and their entailments are important bar-
ometers that can indicate an organization’s or workers’ degree of openness
to change. As the Disney metaphors exemplify, root metaphors and their
entailments can significantly constrain people’s thinking and actions, caus-
ing them to have an attitude that reflects a lack of openness to change. In
contrast, as the Marine Corps metaphor demonstrates, other root metaphors
can create, invite, or even demand possibilities for new thinking and actions
that generate an attitude of openness to change. I am not suggesting that root
metaphors are determinate, that workers’ degree of openness to change is
defined entirely by an organization’s root metaphors. They are, though,
an important linguistic indicator that can help reveal conscious as well as
unconscious or tacit attitudes toward change.
Study Context, Design, and Analysis
I conducted this study at a medium-sized public sector agency with multiple
locations. The organization’s mission is to determine whether people who
perform sensitive tasks should be given access to proprietary information.
These decisions are important because they help ensure information secu-
rity, and they affect people’s careers: A worker denied information access
is very difficult to promote.
Information contained in written reports provides the sole basis for these
decisions. Report assessors (RAs), the target group for this study and the
primary end users of the report information, read these reports, ranging
from 20 to 50 pages, and then decide to grant or deny information access.
The reports are filled with complex financial, personal, and workplace per-
formance information that requires careful interpretation. These reports are
a well-established communication genre. Their purpose and form—style,
format, organization, and document design—have been fixed for decades.
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Previous research has described the unique, creative strategies that RAs use
to organize, interpret, and assess these reports, whose organization, style,
and document design make them difficult for outsiders to understand
(Suchan, 1998).
Study Context
This agency’s organizational policy instructs RAs to use the specific criteria
contained in its Report Assessment and Determination Manual (RADM) to
guide their information-access decisions. This seeming lack of autonomy
that RAs have to use contextual factors and their own judgment to make
decisions is supported by the organization’s structure as a functionally orga-
nized bureaucracy with power relationships that are defined by its hierarch-
ical structure and clearly defined job roles. But as I will explain later, not all
of the agency’s work sites interpreted policy and acted on these constraints
in the same way.
Senior management believed that the document design, organization,
and style of the reports that RAs currently read affected the quality of their
decisions to approve or withhold information access. These managers based
their perceptions both on anecdotal information from RA supervisors and
on the increasing number of decisions to deny information access that were
being challenged in the courts. Furthermore, because new technology and
cost-cutting measures would soon make it necessary for RAs to read these
long reports on computer screens rather than on paper, the senior managers
believed that significant changes in report organization, style, and docu-
ment design were necessary and would be forthcoming in order to make
these reports easier to read and interpret on screen. These managers claimed
that they had effectively communicated these concerns to RAs through their
first-line supervisors; however, in my interviews with RAs, they raised
doubts about the effectiveness of senior management’s communication
about the importance of these changes.
Study Design
This research is embedded in a larger study that analyzed the differences in
the quality of RA decisions between those based on the current reports
and those based on the revised, high-impact reports (Suchan, 1998).
Because the two studies are interrelated and their research designs tightly
connected, I first briefly describe the research design of the decision quality
study and then the design for the openness-to-change study.
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Decision-quality study design. In the larger decision-quality study, 30 RAs
from three agency locations—Ohio, Washington DC, and Maryland—par-
ticipated. After carefully reading over 50 reports from the organization’s
report clearinghouse, I chose two reports, which I named Czarnek and
Rokitka, that represented typical reports. I then revised the reports using
as criteria results from numerous research studies, pinpointing the organi-
zation, style, and design factors that make documents easy to understand. I
called these revised reports high impact (HI) and the original reports low
impact (LI). I also took great care to ensure that the revision did not
change the content of the original reports. Two experienced, senior-
level administrators reviewed the revised reports and determined that
there were no important differences in content, though they stated that the
reports ‘‘looked and read differently.’’ In addition, I was trained as an RA
by a senior administrator so that I would have a solid understanding of RA
work tasks. Furthermore, I conducted six talk-aloud protocols with RAs
(two at each site) to better understand their report reading and decision-
making processes. These experiences and my numerous informal interac-
tions with RAs (over coffee, lunch, and drinks after work) gave me insight
into their work and enabled me to develop a degree of credibility and gain
their trust.
Next, I conducted a quasi-experimental study at the RAs’ work spaces.
At each site, the RAs were randomly divided into two groups, with each
group assessing two reports. Group 1 received the revised HI treatment
of the Czarnek case and the original LI treatment of the Rokitka case. Group
2 received the original LI treatment of the Czarnek case and the HI treat-
ment of the Rokitka case. This 2  2 design ensured that each RA
responded to two different reports: one written in the typical LI style and
one in the revised HI style.
After reading each report, RAs completed a questionnaire that asked for
their report decision—to grant access, deny information access, or request
additional information—and the rationale for that decision. To determine
the ‘‘correct’’ report decision, I conducted protocols with six senior super-
visory RAs from the three assessment sites using the same 2 2 design. All
six RA supervisors would have granted information access for both cases.
This grant decision was the study’s measure for decision quality.
The results were surprising. At two of the three sites there were no sta-
tistically significant differences in the decision results between the HI and
the LI Rokitka and Czarnek cases. But the Maryland RAs made different
assessment decisions, statistically significant at the .01 level, than did their
counterparts at the other sites (Suchan, 1998).
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Openness-to-change study design. To assess openness to change, the focus of
this study, I conducted 18 semistructured individual interviews (6 each from
the Maryland, Washington DC, and Ohio sites) with RAs almost immedi-
ately after they assessed the two cases. Time and RA work commitments
prevented me from interviewing the 10 RAs at each site. Each interview
lasted 20 to 55 minutes, with the mean time being 32 minutes. I either taped
the interview (n ¼ 14) or took notes (n ¼ 4), which I transcribed within 12
hours of the interview.
Approximately 3 months later, I returned to each site and conducted
group interviews with all the RAs (10 from each site) who assessed the
reports. During these interviews, I reported the study results and gathered
RAs’ additional perceptions of and reactions to the HI report treatments.
To jog RAs’ memory of the task and the reports, I provided copies of the
reports that they assessed. These interviews, which I taped and then had
transcribed, lasted between 95 minutes and almost 3 hours. In addition, I
took field notes during these group interviews. Finally, I obtained additional
reactions from RAs to the HI reports during meetings with them at lunch
and over coffee. During these unplanned chats, I was able to talk with 15
of the 18 RAs that I initially interviewed. Although the RAs knew that these
conversations were on the record, these individual and small-group conver-
sations were informal. To preserve that informality, I merely jotted notes
during these conversations; however, I took detailed field notes immedi-
ately afterward.
Textual Analysis Procedures
I analyzed the language in the transcriptions from the meetings, paying
careful attention to the metaphors used and the context of those metaphors.
During this stage of analysis, I viewed the transcripts as a closed textual sys-
tem, focusing exclusively on language, particularly metaphors, and their
patterns and interconnections. I looked for common or broad-based, over-
arching metaphors—what the literature calls root metaphors—and meta-
phoric clusters, commonly called entailments, that support or clarify
these overarching metaphors.
Next, I carefully reviewed my field notes, again paying careful attention
to metaphors revealed in quotes and my observations about how RAs
described the two reports and their emotional and task-related reactions
toward them. Just as important as the metaphors that these field notes, the
transcripts, and my familiarity with the sites revealed was the insight that
they provided into the personal and organizational context that helped
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spawn the metaphors. These contextual factors included information about
job autonomy, task flexibility, the importance of organizational learning,
job satisfaction, group dynamics, trust between coworkers and between
workers and their supervisors, the ways that supervisors exercised power,
and group and organizational politics. These factors were key to under-
standing the different root metaphors at each site, the reasons for their
development, the RAs’ reactions to the HI reports, and the RAs’ degree
of openness to change.
The Results: Different Root Metaphors
at Different Sites
The Maryland RAs used fundamentally different metaphors to interpret
their information assessment tasks and organizational environments than
the RAs did at the other two sites. Maryland RAs frequently described
what they called the ‘‘whole-man’’ or ‘‘whole-person’’ approach to asses-
sing reports. These RAs mentioned this approach in every individual inter-
view, repeatedly during the group interview, and often during informal
discussions. In contrast, the Washington DC RAs discussed the need ‘‘to
paint by the numbers’’ and stay within the lines. And the Ohio RAs referred
to their assessment process as ‘‘look and cook’’: Read the report (look) and
follow the criteria in the RADM (use the recipe to cook). These linguistic
constructions represent the root metaphors at these three sites. Supporting
these root metaphors are a constellation of metaphoric entailments that I
will integrate into my explication of these root metaphors.
The Maryland Site: The ‘‘Whole-Man’’ or ‘‘Whole-Person’’ Approach
The Maryland RAs’ ‘‘whole-man’’ or ‘‘whole-person’’ language may not
meet the rhetoric discipline’s typical definition of a metaphor. But this lan-
guage is a conceptual metaphor (a concept from linguistics) in which an
unfamiliar, generally abstract idea is expressed in familiar terms in order
to better understand and emotionally connect with the concept or idea
(Kovecses, 2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). For these RAs, the RADM, with
its checklists of decision-making criteria that seem to fragment and dehu-
manize people, represents the abstract and thus unfamiliar concept whereas
the terms whole man and whole person represent the familiar and affective
complex person described by the report and, most important, the RAs’
approach to assessing that report. Given their strong commitment, indeed
devotion, to their work and the importance of their assessment decisions,
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the Maryland RAs could only understand and apply the RADM criteria by
generating their whole-man and whole-person metaphors to humanize and
thus transform these standards.
To avoid needless repetition, I am limiting my analysis here to the
Maryland and Washington DC interview data. Even though the Washing-
ton DC RAs’ paint by the numbers and the Ohio RAs’ look and cook are
different metaphors, I found that both root metaphors indicated a similar
lack of openness to change that was influenced by a similar set of contex-
tual factors. In short, my Ohio RA analysis offers no additional insight
about openness to change in written communication.
Maryland RAs’ Initial Reactions to the New Reports
After the Maryland RAs completed their assessment of the HI and LI report
cases, I asked each RA the same open-ended question: ‘‘What are your reac-
tions to the [Czarnek or Rokitka] report?’’ For each interview, I chose the
report written in the HI style. Each RA was eager to talk about the ‘‘new’’
(HI) reports. The following three interview snippets illustrate the content
and the tone of the six interviews:
Who wrote that report [HI version]? It wasn’t no IG [information gatherer].
That report threw me . . . but after a couple of pages it started to make more
sense than the other one [LI report]. You know . . . I found myself thinking
more about that fellow Czarnek [HI report] than that other one [Rokitka LI
report]. That’s good. . . . That helps [me] to see the whole person.
Seeing those two reports back-to-back was real interesting. The new one [HI
version] might make me better at my job. . . . I can really pay attention to all
the stuff . . . the details . . . help me see the whole man instead of just figuring
out what’s going on.
That was a very different exercise. . . . The differences [in reports] was . . .
startling. But you know I could better see patterns in that new one . . . see all
the issues that create the total package . . . you know, the whole person. I need
that [to understand the whole person] to make the right decision.
Although most RAs reported that they were initially ‘‘thrown’’ by the HI
reports because of their novel design and organization, they quickly saw
ways these reports would help them more effectively do their jobs: process
information more easily, focus more on the person being assessed, see
information patterns more easily, and reduce work stress. Not one Maryland
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RA mentioned that the HI reports violated organizational norms, policy, or
guidelines. Furthermore, no one mentioned senior management’s belief that
the current LI reports required change. These RAs demonstrated an open,
flexible, even somewhat imaginative response to the novel HI reports. Key
to understanding that openness and flexibility was the whole-person or
whole-man metaphor that RAs mentioned during their individual inter-
views. That metaphor, which seemed like a slogan because RAs mentioned
it so frequently—21 times during the 6 interviews—became a focus of dis-
cussion during the group interview conducted 3 months later.
Maryland Group Interview
I returned to the Maryland site approximately 3 months after my individual
interviews with the Maryland RAs to discuss the decision results from the
HI and LI report-assessment experiment and to gain additional insight on
the RAs’ degree of openness to the HI case treatments. To refresh the RAs’
memories of the experimental task, I provided copies of the HI and LI treat-
ments of both cases. The decision results, which I provided in a handout,
indicated that the Maryland RAs made different assessment decisions (sta-
tistically significant at the .01 confidence level) than the RAs did at the
other agency sites. Specifically, the RAs who read the HI Rokitka report
made better quality decisions (ones that matched those of their superiors)
than did those who read the LI Rokitka report.
I used the handout listing the decision results from all sites as a prompt to
start the discussion, and as the discussion progressed, I asked additional
open-ended questions. The Maryland RAs reveled in the decision differ-
ences between their site and the others. They explained these differences
by referring to the whole-man metaphor and other similar metaphors
(entailments) to characterize how they approached report assessment. One
RA’s comment well summarizes their explanation, ‘‘Look, you’ve been
around us for a while now—drank coffee, had lunch, sat with us when
we did our work. We talk about this [whole-man approach]. That’s how
we approach the work.’’ They claimed that RAs at other sites merely fol-
lowed the ‘‘rule book’’ [the RADM] and were ‘‘slaves to the rules because
they’re so damn political,’’ which resulted in their being ‘‘rigid,’’ ‘‘kind of
mechanical,’’ and ‘‘not using judgment that comes from real-world experi-
ence’’ in assessing reports. When I asked them how they knew how RAs in
other agencies approached their work, one RA replied a bit sarcastically,
‘‘We do get out and talk to other RAs. . . . We’re not kept down on the
farm.’’ The Maryland site is rural, and the RAs are somewhat sensitive
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about being thought of as lacking ‘‘big city sophistication.’’ Another RA
indicated that once a year, the RAs attend a conference where they interact
with RAs from other agencies and ‘‘swap lessons learned and best practices
and just talk about the work.’’
The RAs used a network of other metaphors that complemented and pro-
vided additional insight into the RA-constructed meaning of the whole-man
approach, the attitude toward work that the metaphor both reflected and fur-
ther reinforced, and the behaviors that resulted from this attitude. To inter-
pret a report well and make a good assessment decision, RAs stated that
they had to ‘‘go beyond the words on the page,’’ ‘‘not be a slave to the
RADM,’’ ‘‘be open and flexible to people’s [individuals being assessed] cir-
cumstances,’’ ‘‘hold off judgment while reading the report,’’ ‘‘be the person
in the report,’’ ‘‘be open to surprises—good ones and bad ones,’’ and the
paradoxical ‘‘judge while being nonjudgmental.’’ This language reflects a
collective cognitive script—a mental model or interpretive frame—that
steers the RAs to interpret novelty, difference, or change in an open, flex-
ible, nonjudgmental manner.
The RAs clearly demonstrated the impact of this whole-man root meta-
phor on their openness to change and new learning when I asked them (3
months after their initial exposure to these reports) for their reactions to the
HI reports. The RAs indicated that they now believed the HI reports more
clearly told the story of the person’s life and that they could ‘‘better figure
out the whole person . . . spend more time thinking about what they
did . . . than trying to figure out [emphasis added] what they did.’’ The RAs
pointed out that they did not realize until they read the HI reports that they
had spent so much time trying to untangle the story line in the LI reports: ‘‘I
didn’t realize the drain on me it was reading these [LI] reports. A lot of us
use different colored markers, sticky notes, a whole bunch of things to help
us read these things. . . . All that takes time.’’ Another RA added, ‘‘We
make real good decisions here . . . because, you know, we talked about this
before. . . . We take a whole-man view . . . but I’d bet that after a while we’d
be able to make better decisions on really complicated cases with these new
reports.’’
The Maryland RAs’ openness to and support of the HI reports surprised
me because I had encountered strong resistance toward the new reports
from RAs at the other sites. I asked the Maryland RAs why they were so
accepting of the HI reports. One RA was taken aback by the question:
‘‘Look, we’re interested in anything that could help us do our jobs
better. . . . These new reports could help.’’ Another said, ‘‘We’re pretty flex-
ible here, though most probably wouldn’t think so. We’re given a lot of
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room by our bosses to do our jobs.’’ Finally, the most senior (in job tenure
and age) RA commented, ‘‘We’re older . . . confident at what we do . . .
pretty mature . . . not defensive about things. The new reports were just dif-
ferent . . . not a real threat to anything.’’
I next asked if their whole-man approach had anything to do with their
openness to the HI reports. Initially, the RAs were silent; the question
seemed to surprise them and perhaps caused them to think about the
approach in a way they never had before. Finally, one RA speculated,
‘‘Probably the whole-man approach is more than about making assessment
decisions. . . . It’s probably about how we look at a lot of things . . . at life.’’
Another RA answered, ‘‘[She] might be onto something here. . . . This
whole-person way of looking causes us to see things differently. . . . We
hear about how we always want more facts . . . more stuff. . . . before decid-
ing. Maybe we do see things differently and these new reports are just
another different thing.’’
I reported to the Maryland RAs that their counterparts at the other sites
were strongly opposed to the HI report treatments, believing that the new
reports violated agency policy about information gatherers (IGs) making
assessment decisions and that the new reports could cause their jobs to be
downgraded to a lower pay classification. The Maryland RAs laughed. One
stated, ‘‘Compared to us, those RAs are inexperienced. They’re scared,
they’re young, they follow the rules because they want to jump [work for
another agency], and they probably have [supervisors] beating them over
the head to make sure they follow the rules. I can see why these new reports
would make them nervous.’’ Another RA added, ‘‘Those RAs don’t have
confidence. . . . Now everyone here is confident they can do the job . . . so
when we see something like this new report, we think, ‘can this help us
do the work better?’ It’s [HI reports] not a threat.’’ One RA well summar-
ized how the way they see their job affects their attitude toward the HI
reports: ‘‘I guess if you think about the job as following the rules in the
RADM, then I can see why the new reports would make you nervous. But
the whole-man way . . . we’ve talked about it a lot today . . . is about judg-
ment, experience, reading what’s not there and what’s there. No difference
in the way a report is written can replace that.’’
The Maryland RAs’ whole-man metaphor, then, is a generative, or
growth inducing, root metaphor that both reflects and reinforces through
ongoing use a mental model or interpretative framework for their way of
thinking about, attitude toward, and behavior at work. As we have seen, this
whole-man approach is a flexible, contingency-based approach to reading,
interpreting, and ultimately assessing a report in which RAs call on their
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own lived experiences, values, and ability to see the report as a complete
information set rather than merely discrete facts to apply to the rigid criteria
in the RADM. Because these RAs saw themselves as having flexibility and
autonomy in their work that allowed them to make the best assessment deci-
sions, they were able to be open to the novel HI reports. Indeed, as the RAs
comments indicate, their whole-man approach both reflects and helps to
continually reinforce their openness and even predisposition to change—
as long as they can see the value of that change.
An important subtext throughout the interviews helps explain the RAs’
interpretation of the whole-person root metaphor and their openness to the
novel reports: the RAs’ belief that supervisors valued their work, trusted their
assessment decisions, provided numerous opportunities for them to interact
and learn from each other (e.g., conveniently arranged work spaces, coffee
break rooms, formal best-practices meetings), and gave them latitude in using
the RADM to make decisions. These contextual factors helped RAs to be able
to review and modify their assessment practices in complex cases without fear-
ing that novel actions would cause them to be sanctioned or even punished. In
essence, the Maryland RA supervisors helped create an environment and cul-
ture that provided opportunity for individual and organizational learning, and
the RAs’ commitment to and belief in the importance of their work caused
them to take advantage of that opportunity. This learning environment fostered
the RAs’ attitude of flexibility, their willingness to consider something new—
that is, their openness to change—that would help them do their jobs better.
This attitude is captured in their use and interpretation of the whole-person root
metaphor and the entailments that complemented that metaphor.
The Washington DC Site: ‘‘Paint by the Numbers’’ and ‘‘Stay Within
the Lines’’
During my individual interviews with the Washington DC RAs immedi-
ately following their assessment of the two cases, two RAs made comments
that best capture the site’s root metaphors:
You know this work isn’t really all that difficult. . . . You just have to learn to
paint by the numbers. You know what I mean . . . those old paint sets . . . the
ones that had pictures with numbers on them. You match the number with the
paint and fill it in. That’s about what we do here.
If you stay within the lines . . . you know what the RADM says . . . you’ll stay
out of trouble and get the job done. No one will be breathing down your neck.
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These ‘‘paint by the numbers’’ and ‘‘stay within the lines’’ metaphors
reflected the RAs’ beliefs that the RADM provided rules rather than guide-
lines and that it was politically strategic to rigidly apply those rules when
assessing reports.
The RAs mentioned these two metaphors and others very similar repeat-
edly in individual interviews immediately after they completed their case
assessments and 3 months later in group interviews when I reported the
decision results and gathered additional information about their reactions
to the HI reports. For example, one RA said she had to make sure she did
not ‘‘color outside the lines’’ when assessing reports while others nodded
in agreement. Several RAs indicated their need ‘‘to stay within the box’’
created by the RADM. Finally, another group of RAs indicated they needed
to make sure they did not ‘‘go out of bounds’’ when assessing reports. These
metaphors, fundamentally different from those at the Maryland site, indi-
cate a tight, seemingly unforgiving control system that discourages change
and new learning.
Washington DC RAs’ Initial Reactions to the New Reports
As with the other two sites, I individually interviewed 6 of 10 Washington
RAs after they completed their assessment of the HI and LI report cases. I
asked each RA the same open-ended question, ‘‘What are your reactions to
the [Czarnek or Rokitka] report?’’ For each interview, I chose the report
written in the HI style. These RAs not only were resistant to the HI reports,
but they also had a strong emotional reaction to them:
That new report violates policy. Whoever wrote that report . . . I bet it wasn’t
one of the IGs . . . was making decisions . . . was interpreting finan-
cial . . . That’s our job. You just can’t do that! We have our box of cray-
ons . . . they [IGs] have theirs. . . . You can’t mix them . . . you can’t!
Come on now. You’ve got to be kidding. . . . That report was trash! It breaks
the rules how these things need to be done. . . . It’s outside the lines. You’d
have to rewrite the RADM and change our jobs . . . our job descriptions before
those types of reports could be used.
Didn’t like it, period . . . too outside the box. The new type reports screw with
the work we do. We do the analysis . . . the assessment—not the reports. I
can’t see using them [HI reports].
I dismissed the report [HI version] when I saw it . . . it was too out of
bounds. . . . No way would it work around here.
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Unlike the Maryland RAs, who quickly saw ways that the HI reports could
help them do their work more effectively, the Washington DC RAs viewed
these reports as violations of their communication-genre norms (‘‘outside
the box,’’ ‘‘outside the lines,’’ and ‘‘out of bounds’’), their job roles, and
their organization’s policy. Not once during these interviews did a
Washington DC RA mention a possible advantage or benefit of the HI
reports or appear to be open at all to its potential for improving decision
making, decreasing report-reading time, or reducing the stress caused by
difficult-to-read reports. And not one RA mentioned senior leadership con-
cerns about decision quality and whether the HI reports could improve it.
While having lunch (a serendipitous event) with five of the RAs the day
after the initial interviews, I mentioned the dominance of this root meta-
phor, asking them if they were aware of how often they used this kind of
language to describe their work and what caused them to talk about their
work that way. They laughed when I mentioned the prevalence of their talk
about painting by the numbers, staying within the lines, and not going out-
side the box and seemed unsure of the significance of these metaphors. One
quipped, ‘‘We’re all K-mart Picassos here.’’ Another said, ‘‘Look at all the
different-colored markers we use to figure out what’s going on in these
reports. . . . When I’m done marking up one of these reports, it looks kinda
like a painting.’’ These RAs mentioned that they did not create these meta-
phors, so they must have been part of the typical talk at the organization
when they started working there. One RA commented, ‘‘We jump [change
jobs] a lot . . . so these words was [sic] something I picked up here. That’s
just how people talk . . . no big deal.’’ The other RAs nodded in agreement.
Although the RAs lacked insight into the significance of their customary
metaphors, they did provide important contextual information about why
these metaphors became an important part of their discourse. They pointed
out that they work in a ‘‘fish bowl,’’ a political environment caused by being
within the ‘‘beltway’’ (a Washington DC area within the interstate highways
encircling the city where much high-visibility government business is con-
ducted). They also observed that most people, particularly younger ones,
working in the agency are ‘‘agency jumpers’’: They move fairly often to dif-
ferent agencies and jobs for better career opportunities. Consequently, as
one RA pointed out, ‘‘We all try to keep our noses clean . . . not just us but
our supervisors too.’’ Another RA believed that ‘‘it could be dangerous to
step out and try something new [a more nuanced way of interpreting
information]. . . . If it blew up, you’ll be in trouble.’’ These RAs suggested
that getting a poor performance review or developing a reputation for being
‘‘troublesome’’ could make it difficult to switch agencies. Consequently, to
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maintain their career flexibility, these RAs believed they had to paint by the
numbers, stay within the lines, or stay within the box. In their current jobs,
that meant carefully following the decision guidelines in the RADM.
These RAs also claimed that they are competitive and know how ‘‘to
play the game.’’ They seemed to be almost exclusively focused on doing
what was best to further their careers. The demographics help support this
claim: All had college degrees, were 28 to 35 years old, had worked for sev-
eral agencies, had between 2 and 3 years of experience as an RA at this
agency, and were mostly single, which, they claimed, provided them with
job flexibility. For most of them—and their immediate supervisors—this
job was merely a way station, a stopping point, in their career journey.
The root metaphors paint by the numbers and stay within the lines and
their entailments capture a work attitude, perhaps even a work philosophy,
that causes these RAs to be suspicious of change and to see it as a potential
cost, particularly to their careers. These metaphors indicate that the RAs
perceive their work as a series of rigidly defined organizational routines
that, if performed correctly, provide them with protection from supervisors
who might use their power unjustly or unethically and auditors who might
have a strict compliance mentality. Furthermore, these metaphors imply a
lack of organizational trust, which was likely caused by the transient nature
of the work relationships due to the RAs’ and their supervisors’ agency-
jumping habits, a hierarchic control system that created the perception that
errors would be dealt with harshly, and a strong focus on careerism. This
lack of organizational trust contributed to a climate that was political,
averse to risk, and thus suspicious of change.
Washington DC Group Interview
As with the other two sites, I returned to the Washington DC site 3 months
after the individual interviews to discuss the decision results from the HI
and LI report-assessment experiment and to gather additional information
about the RAs’ initial, emotional reaction to the HI reports. All 10 RAs
attended the group interview, which lasted 2 hours and 40 minutes. As with
the Maryland group, I provided copies of the HI and LI treatments of the
Rokitka and Czarnek cases to refresh their memories of the experimental
task that they had completed 3 months earlier. After I described the decision
results that were listed in the handout I had provided, the RAs then animat-
edly discussed their reactions to the HI reports and their reasons for those
reactions.
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The RAs were surprised to learn that there were no differences in their
decision results between the HI and LI cases. Their reasons for being sur-
prised baffled me. They thought that RAs reading the LI reports would
make better decisions than would those reading HI ones. When I asked why
they thought that, the RAs once again focused on their misgivings about the
HI reports. All but one of the RAs had serious concerns about the HI reports.
The following RA comment well represents these concerns:
You know after you left . . . that was about 3 or so months ago, right? . . . we
continued to talk . . . between ourselves . . . about those new reports. We
couldn’t get past the fact those reports changed the job. You have to try to
understand . . . those reports didn’t make sense to us. Sure we could read and
understand them, but it was too outside the box.
All but one of the RAs, then, had agreed that the HI reports ‘‘didn’t make
sense’’; they were ‘‘outside the box’’ and were ‘‘out of bounds.’’ And after
3 months, they still looked and felt that way. In other words, these RAs cate-
gorized the HI reports as ‘‘abnormal’’ or deviant discourse that short-
circuited their sense-making processes.
I asked what could be done to have the HI reports make sense and not
seem outside the box. One RA shook his head and said rather dramatically,
‘‘You’d have to blow up the whole damn place . . . change everything . . . the
RADM . . . our job descriptions . . . how the IGs [report writers] do their
jobs . . . everything. And I do mean everything.’’ Another RA added,
‘‘You’d also have to change the assessment rules . . . the RADM . . . and our
job descriptions too. All those different things would have to be lined up
before these new reports would fit in.’’ Finally, an RA offered this
suggestion:
Look, I’m always looking over my shoulder, covering my six. If all the people
who write up and sign off on my evals were to say here’s what you want me to
read, then I’d do it. Those are the people who tell me here’s your box of cray-
ons and this is how I want you to color. I gotta be honest, and I bet a lot of you
feel this way, but what interests my bosses fascinates the hell out of me.
Clearly, the organizational environment at the Washington DC site pro-
motes following routines. And adhering to the document design, organiza-
tion, and style of the customary LI reports is merely one, albeit an extremely
important one, of a series of routines that the RAs rely on at this site.
Because they so strongly rely on routines, they rarely review or reassess
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their work practices and assessment processes. This lack of review and reas-
sessment retards organizational learning and fosters an attitude toward
change that sees it as a threat rather than a necessary condition of adapting
to changes in an organization’s internal and external environments. As we
have seen, the root metaphors that these RAs use capture their suspicion
toward change and resistance to new learning. The RAs ongoing use of the
paint-by-the-numbers and stay-within-the-lines root metaphors and their
entailments both represents and reinforces current organizational routines
(e.g., the value of the LI reports) and provides an interpretive lens that
causes the RAs to be suspicious and even somewhat hostile toward the
change represented by the HI report. Unlike the Maryland RAs, the
Washington DC RAs, when provided feedback about their use of these
metaphors, appeared either incapable or unwilling to assess the effect that
these metaphors had on their thinking and actions.
Final Observations
Determining ways of gauging workers’ openness to change, particularly to
significant change in their organization’s communication practices, is an
overlooked area in the business and managerial communication literature.
This study has indicated that one useful approach to gauging such openness
is through analyzing workers’ organizational discourse. Themes and in par-
ticular metaphors in workers’ everyday discourse can reveal their both con-
scious and tacit attitudes toward change that can predict if they will strongly
resist, even deliberately sabotage, change efforts or actively support, even
champion, those efforts. As this study has shown, the root metaphors and
their entailments that emerged from the discourse of two different agency
sites—Maryland and Washington DC—indicated that the respective work-
ers at these sites had vastly different degrees of openness to changes in a
report’s organization, style, and design. The Maryland RAs’ whole-man
root metaphor both reflected and helped reaffirm an open, flexible attitude
toward organizational work that resulted in their willingness to entertain the
value of the novel HI reports. In marked contrast, the Washington DC RAs’
root metaphors—paint by the numbers and stay within the lines—both
reflected and reaffirmed their misgivings about changes in organizational
routines, resulting in their lack of openness, indeed strong resistance,
toward the HI reports.
Such root metaphors and their entailments emerge from an organiza-
tion’s complex cognitive scripts—sometimes referred to as mental models
or interpretive schemes—which provide the collective templates that shape
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workers’ attitudes toward and influence their actions at work. These scripts
take form and become explicit in workers’ interpretation of organizational
policies, their reactions toward organizational control systems, their atti-
tudes toward organizational structure in general and hierarchy in particular,
and their perception of power and politics in their organizational relation-
ships, particularly with supervisors. Furthermore, the unique personal char-
acteristics of the RAs at the Maryland and Washington DC sites—their
ages, levels of maturity, career goals, loyalties, and so on—interact with
their organization’s cognitive scripts to create a complex organizational
context. The root metaphors and their entailments in the RAs’ discourse
reflect their interpretation of this context and thus provide a window into
their attitudes and reactions toward change.
This study may create the impression that the differences in the discourse
between the two sites are stark and would be obvious to anyone outside
these organizations. But that is not the case. First, the research design of this
study brings into sharp focus certain unique aspects of each site’s discourse
by examining it during two specific and unique circumstances: soon after
the RAs had completed assessments of two reports (HI and LI) and 3
months afterward when I reported the results. Furthermore, the rhetorical
conventions of presenting new knowledge in a research article in a coher-
ent, structured manner preclude capturing the messiness and true complex-
ity of the RAs’ organizational talk that focused on a wide variety of work
and personal issues and took surprising and unclear twists and turns.
These results were also not immediately clear-cut to me. When I gath-
ered the data, I did not have a theoretical framework (e.g., the degree of
openness to change) to assess the organizational talk and the metaphors that
emerged from it. To be blunt, I did not know what to do with the data I had
gathered. I only knew that there was a connection between the metaphors at
the different sites, the RAs’ reactions to the HI reports, and the power of
discourse communities to shape their members’ perceptions of communica-
tion effectiveness. I did not make the connection between these metaphors
and the RAs’ openness to change until much later when I was teaching an
MBA managerial communications course. To illustrate the difference
between the efficiency and the perceived effectiveness of written commu-
nication as well as the power of language communities, I was showing
excerpts from the HI and LI reports used in this study and the metaphoric
language that the RAs used in their reactions to the novel HI reports. One
student observed that his organization strongly resisted change, and he pro-
vided several common organizational aphorisms and slogans that contained
metaphors implying that lack of openness to change. This student went on
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to observe he would have a difficult time implementing in his organization
many of the communication strategies we discussed in class. That student’s
insight—a eureka moment for me—caused me to turn to the change litera-
ture to provide the overarching theoretical framework for this study.
While conducting this work, I unearthed a large number of additional
research questions. Here are the questions that I believe are the most important:
 Is a significant intervention necessary in order to change organiza-
tional communication norms? In efforts to change communication
routines, is there a point at which the change becomes so great that
it triggers significant resistance?
 Do management and executive communication-development pro-
grams, particularly if they are one-shot efforts, have any significant
impact on or value for communication? Do these programs need to
be embedded throughout organizational systems—for example,
feedback and reward systems—in order to support changes in com-
munication practice?
 Are we actually attempting to make our MBA and executive MBA
students communication-change agents in the workforce since the
communication strategies and practices we often teach will likely run
counter to the communication norms of the organizations in which
they will work? If that is the case, should we incorporate change the-
ories and strategies into our managerial or leadership communication
instruction?
 How much power or agency do individual or small groups of workers
have in changing dysfunctional language norms? Must a cataclysmic
failure in communication occur to create a sense of urgency that
shakes the organization out of its communication routines?
 Are communication-development professionals within an organiza-
tion capable of assessing their organization’s openness to communi-
cation change by assessing organizational talk and the metaphors that
emerge from that talk? Because that talk is so embedded in their own
language, will these organizational members not notice its unique-
ness? Is there a need to bring in outside consultants to assess an orga-
nization’s openness to communication change?
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